Crisis and Possible Revolutions

Crisis and Possible Revolutions
Conversation with Toni Negri and Michael Hardt

Michael Hardt: I don’t think that the concept of Empire has undergone a great transformation. From my point of view, what has been interesting is the debate around it, in the sense that when the book Empire was published, there was a quite important debate and, I suppose, expectations regarding discussions on the new forms of globalisation for a while, at least until September 11th or maybe until 2003. Then, for a long period of time, between 2003 and 2007, on the left in general and especially the institutional left, there was a return to the concept of American imperialism, that said, “maybe for a certain period of time we were in a position to consider a new form of globalisation, but it’s clear now with the American soldiers in Baghdad, that this is the same American imperialism that we’ve always been seeing.” This is what we could call the halfway point. Now we’ve returned to a point where I’d say there’s a consensus around the idea that the United States is no longer capable of managing the world in the traditional sense and that there will be some kind of new imperial-type globalisation.

What interests me is not so much the change from our point of view, because I don’t think it has changed that much over the last fifteen years, but the public debate around these concepts, which has gone through periods where there has been substantial disagreement. Now there’s something like a concept of a consolidated empire, at least in part. The debate today is a little like this: there is a division between those who think that a new centre of world capitalism must evolve (we can call that the ‘Braudelian hypothesis,’ along with the Wallerstein school, Harvey, etc.) and who especially see China as the new centre of globalisation, and the other hypothesis, which we’re part of, which sees a more radical transformation of the world system. According to this hypothesis, not only is the United States no longer managing globalisation, but no nation-state is capable of doing that and, therefore, we must develop or think about some new way that is more horizontal, more complex, etc. These are the phases I see. I hope I’ve made myself clear.

And about the concept of the multitude, too?

Antonio Negri: You can say basically the same about the concept of the multitude. This concept was originally very controversial in the sense that it seemed to be simply directed at criticising the concept of class: working class, a unified class, a reconstituted class. But now I think that the concept of the multitude has become quite common, even at times persistent, since people began to see that the new movements – and I would say that the ‘occupy’ movements are absolutely exemplary from this point of view – began to act like swarms, like aggregates of singularities coming together. This concept of the multitude does not merely refer to an aggregate of singularities, but an aggregate of singularities in motion that connect as they move: the twitter-multitude, right? This is a concept that is entering the collective mindset from a practical point of view and also gives the word some substance.

Michael Hardt: . On one hand, it’s clear that we could construct quite a catalogue of the battles against the privatisation of the commons. To a large extent, what could be called anti-neoliberal battles are battles against the privatisation of the commons. Why? Because at least in part, as David Harvey says in his texts, the neoliberal strategy consists of privatising the commons. I can’t remember the exact concept that he formulated, but it is more or less that. And not only dominant societies have a neoliberal strategy of privatising the public, transportation, social services, etc., but in so-called dominated societies, there is often a privatisation of the commons, of oil, of mineral wealth, etc. and there are thousands of battles opposing these capitalist practices. So it is easy to make a list of what these people are doing, the resistance in this field, but it might be more interesting to think about how to find an alternative form of management, meaning one that doesn’t only try to fight privatisation, but also to introduce an alternative to the public management of these things. For example, we’re in a battle against Exxon in Colombia, but it’s not just about giving control to the state. That’s why I think that developing this question about how to introduce common management of the commons is the most difficult thing today. We have some examples. We have repeatedly spoken about the question of water in Italy, about the referendum against the privatisation of water, but also about the difficulty with introducing an alternative that isn’t only the expansion of state power. How can we manage the distribution of water, how to make water a common good, efficiently, and how to manage it? This strikes me as the big problem.

Antonio Negri: I think it’s exactly in this constitutional or constituent terrain of the commons that there is already a quite varied concentration of intellectual interests. Today, even within social democracy this problem is starting to be heard – although with many reservations which I think are important. With the collapse of what we could call the ‘Blair hypothesis’ – the social democratic ‘third way’ that Blair applied in England, backed by Giddens and a slew of other intellectuals – this has all faded. For example, in the French electoral campaign today, social democracy is trying to somehow take up the concept of the commons through, for example, François Balon, who’s back in the game. François Balon is a quite important French intellectual who is also in the Collège de France and who is trying to respond to the problems in what we call communalité or commonality. So, this is a problem that’s getting interesting. It’s about seeing how this problem of the third way will be applied because these days, with existing constitutions – and, therefore, with the social fabric and politics – there’s the private, there’s the public, but there isn’t any commons. The commons must be invented, redefined, imposed. The market, as an expression, as the mediator for private property, is there, and plans that are the expressions and mediations of public power are built on it. Now we have to understand how singularity can be inserted into the commons as constructed by the commons. And it is not by a third way. I think the third way is really the public plus the commons. The commons, on the contrary, is the fundamental point that is opposed to the private and all privatisation. For example, the greatest problem we have today is understanding how to go from the public to the commons, how to go from public management and state management to common goods: water, air, music, materially constructed things, the copyright of computer circulation, etc., how to go from this to common management. This is the big problem we have today, I think, as well as experiences with quote-unquote “revolutionary renovation” (said in inverted commas, in the sense that the old models of social organisation are not repeated).

I certainly think that if we can take an institution and manage it productively from a political or intellectual point of view and make this institution autonomous, a centre of production of subjectivity, this is a huge step forward. Some universities work like that…

Michael Hardt: …the university is a good example…

Antonio Negri: …these universities, for example, where as I said, structures are already working that are autonomous and self-formed, with a relationship with the teachers that is a relationship of a deep community. These ideas were born in the 1960s and basically developed then and they are based not only on the political revolution of ’68, but especially on the technological computer revolution. Without this type of strong, autonomous, independent associationalism, it is impossible to conceive of the developments in the cognitive industry, the computer industry, that have taken place since ’68. It is very, very important to think about this. What is obviously fundamental is that these attempts and experiences, these vital Erlebnissen related to the construction of the new do not corrupt the base in their search for state mediators, for ways to advance, etc. This is really very dangerous, because the force of the state is, despite everything, a terribly corrupting force.

Michael Hardt: Here, too, we have to face the old difficulty of socialist transition: the move from the public to the commons experiences all the difficulties of the transition from socialism to communism, like a transition guided by institutions, from above, and, therefore – even though I see this as a difficult and dangerous minefield – we must introduce a procedure to transform public state control into a common management that does not participate in the illusions of this tradition.